Introduction
Mobile Financial Services offer significant opportunities for improving the efficiency of financial services by expanding access and lowering transaction costs. The rapid public acceptance of these services in many countries, including the Philippines, Brazil, India, Uganda and Kenya has demonstrated that the technology is mature and brings real benefits to people who previously could not access financial products or services.
IFC has recognized the potential of using Mobile Money as a mechanism to deliver financial inclusion and, in November 2012 Mobile Money was formally adopted as a significant part of its Access to Finance work.
According to the GSMA 1 website, as of September 2013, there are 192 live Mobile Money operations in the world, and a further 109 in planning. In 2012, the GSM Mobile Money survey 2 indicated that there are 82 mil people registered for Mobile money globally. With this number of operations and a growing number of customers involved in the service, formalized risk management which balances the assurance of an enabling environment that is conducive to innovation and economic development against consumer protection concerns becomes more and more important.
This importance is amplified in Annexures A and B to this document, which highlight emerging fraud trends in Uganda. In one case, a supplier of Mobile Money services lost $3.5 million to a single type of fraud. The inherent nature of the frauds observed in Uganda is not reliant on any specific aspect of Uganda's economy or social structure and is thus replicable in many other Mobile Money operations if processes are not put into place to control the risks.
Products currently being sold within Mobile Money operations
Across the 192 live deployments, Mobile Money and / or the Agency Banking model which it enables have been applied to:
• Deposit and transact products • Over the counter bill payments • Intra country remittances, both over the counter and based upon the Mobile Transaction accounts • International remittances • Savings products • Lending products (Secured and unsecured)
Selling and servicing each of the products above via Mobile and Agency banking introduces a set of risks, some of which are common across the product lines and some of which are unique to each product.
Mobile Financial Services Model Definitions

Bank Model:
In a pure bank model a bank (or other licensed deposit taking institution) holds the customer funds. Each client either holds an account with the bank, or a Mobile Wallet. The service typically provides mobile access to balance inquiry, transfers between accounts, and payments. Access can be provided through the Internet or through a cell phone based system where a cell phone menu is used to guide the customer. The bank assumes responsibility for the service.
This type of service provides convenience to existing bank clients and to the bank itself by enabling some routine transactions to be performed without visiting a bank branch, which saves time and costs for both the client and for the bank while enabling bank branches to serve a larger number of clients due to the reduced branch traffic. Some banks have also used Mobile banking to address market segments which they have not historically been able to reach.
Banks may expand access through use of agents to represent the bank for account opening and cash in or out services. Transactions initiated through the bank's agents are relayed back to the bank and pass over the client's account or wallet, and the bank assumes responsibility for the actions of its agents.
MNO (Mobile Network Operator) Model:
A pure cell phone company (MNO) service extends the wireless network messaging functionality to provide payment services that enable customers to remit funds to each other that can be settled through the MNO's established agent network. Individual payment transactions occur entirely within the MNO and do not require the service user to have a bank account.
The funds in transit -paid in by the remitter but not yet withdrawn by the recipient, are matched by a deposit in a segregated account with one or more banks (trust account if under common law), so are within the formal financial system.
Since the service provider is only executing client payment instructions and is not performing the credit evaluation and risk management function of a bank, these services arguably do not constitute "banking" and do not require the level of regulatory oversight needed for deposits that are used to fund lending.
The depository bank has no involvement in or responsibility for payments through the MNO system. Given the relatively high cost of a bank account (minimum balance, service charges, full KYC requirements, and travel time to a branch) and the easy, low cost and increasingly universal access to cell phone services, the MNO model arguably is highly effective in brining informal cash transactions into a form of formal financial system, expanding access to financial services.
Hybrid Model:
A combination of a bank, MNO or other third party that offers communications and financial transaction services that combine characteristics of both the pure bank and pure MNO models. Such combination hybrid models include but are not limited to:
• MNO/Bank Model: Cell phone company based payment services that handle payments internally with cash in/out through the MNO's agent network, yet link to formal banking services such as savings, loans and insurance in partnership with a regulated financial institution by enabling communications with the bank and transfers between the user's cell phone payment account and accounts at the bank. Most mobile financial services are hybrid, drawing on the relative strengths of the partners involved.
• Government Provider/Bank Model: A government sponsored interbank clearing system includes consumer access functionality, either using smart cards or smart cell phone Sims that temporarily act as a store of value and synchronize with a formal bank account. The cell phone company, if involved, provides communications services while the government operates the payment switch between banks and between accounts within banks.
Risk Definitions
In this document, the risks discussed are only those ADDED by the mobile channel and associated agency banking model. These are therefore in addition to any core risks borne within a typical retail banking environment.
Systemic:
A risk that could cause collapse of, or significant damage to, the financial system or a risk which results in adverse public perception, possibly leading to lack of confidence and worse case scenario, a "run" on the system and/or contagion effect 2. Operational: A risk which damages the ability of one of the stakeholders to effectively operate their business or a risk which results in a direct or indirect loss from failed internal processes, people, systems or external events 3. Reputation: A risk that damages the image of one of the stakeholders, the mobile system, the financial system, or of a specific product. 4. Legal: A risk which could result in unforeseeable lawsuits, judgment or contracts that could disrupt or affect MFS business practices 5. Liquidity: A risk that lessens the ability of a bank or MFS provider/agent to meet cash obligations upon demand 6. Fraud: A risk which increases the exposure of one or more stakeholders to loss of their money held within the system as a result of deliberate deception, trickery, or cheating by other stakeholders in the system.
The Role of Mobile Network Operators and Banks
Of all the participants in Mobile Money operation, the participants with the most variable roles across differing implementations are the Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and the Banks.
The roles assumed by an MNO or bank include any or a combination of the following: When analyzing the risk borne by an MNO or bank it is important first to analyse which of the above roles the entity is performing. In the Table below, the risks are analysed by role rather than performer of the role.
Risk Matrix
The matrix below demonstrates the most common risks identified in Only allowing each customer to have one account in the system PIN protection, and good processes for PIN resets.
Impersonation of provider status
An unauthorized agent acts as an authorized agent, mostly performing cash in and cash out transactions but charging fees which are not agreed to by the scheme operator, or for the purpose of confidence trickery to gain access to the customer's secret information.
There have also been incidents where such "agents" have defrauded the depositor and absconded with the deposited amount. Clearly publishing the fee structure to the client, as well as consistent agent branding. Agents should assist the MM provider to identify the active, but unauthorized agents in the market. Clients should be educated that, unless they are notified by the Mobile Money scheme directly of any given deposit, they should not pay over their cash to the agent.
Agent
Inability to transact
The transactions within a mobile payments network travel through many communications systems to reach the MM backend. Any breakage in this chain can lead to an inability to transact. Customer literacy levels are also a factor here. Arrangements should be made with the operator to disable sms retry patterns for MM transactions. This means that a transaction will either succeed in a very short period of time or fail, leaving the customer in a more sure position after transaction submission. Transaction requests should also be numbered at source by the MM menu on the phone, and the back end system should only post a given transaction request once. Relationship difficulties between the owners of the service -leading to service outage MM products are often delivered by consortia of mobile operator(s), bank(s) agent network manager(s) and agents. These consortia are often serviced by third party software vendors whose support is critical for systems changes. Any significant relationship difficulty within this consortium could result in service unavailability to a client or to all clients. The relationships need to be carefully planned at service inception to ensure that all parties are adequately reimbursed for their participation in the process. The MM provider needs to retain a position of consortium leadership to ensure that all parties remain committed to the product.
Agent
Transaction delayed by network
Message delivery through a mobile network takes place via multiple interconnected systems. At each point in the chain delays are possible. Any delay in transmission leaves the customer and agent in a difficult The product rollout needs to be managed as a network product, ie agents, bill pay recipients, merchant payment locations etc need to be rolled out in a geographically harmonized manner. Rolling out a card in conjunction with the mobile money product may also enable access to existing payment system resources.
Lack of cash or electronic float at agent outlet A client wishing to deposit or withdraw money to the system may be temporarily or permanently unable to do so on account of the agent not having sufficient cash or electronic float to perform a transaction. The relationships need to be carefully planned at service inception to ensure that all parties are adequately reimbursed for their participation in the process. The MM provider needs to retain a position of consortium leadership to ensure that all parties remain committed to the product. Lack of clarity as to who holds customer money Mobile Money products are often offered under another brand (such as that of an MNO) and the client may not be aware of the licensed financial entity which actually holds his / her funds. This could make enforcing rights more complicated for the client. In many Mobile Money applications, the customer telephone number is used as the primary identifier of the customer. Adding and processing a check digit into the customer mobile number to make the account number decreases the likelihood of an incorrectly captured number being accepted as a beneficiary number. The Mobile Money operation needs to provide customer with a redress process in the event of incorrect beneficiary data capture. Fraudulent use of mobile number Mobile numbers are aliases for the customer IMSEI within the GSM networks. These can therefore be reappropriated within the network, or the number can be appropriated in the street via handset or sim card theft. Pin security is key for managing this risk. To prevent network centered replay, encryption of the pin, to a higher standard than the GSM native encryption, within any SMS messages is also recommended. The lender needs to closely monitor repayment patterns and respond quickly to unexpected behavior by the client. "Because of so many unregistered Sim cards, it's very hard to track suspects and arrest them. Other conmen use fake details to register Sim cards used in mobile money fraud," the source said.
Agent
Agent -None
Fraud at work:
Timothy Arinanye, 32, a mobile money agent lost Shs 3.5m to a conman last Wednesday. He says that a client with telephone number 0783860927 wanted to deposit Shs 356,600 onto his account.
"When my employer gave this conman the phone to put the pin number, he transacted Shs 3,566,000 and sent it to his phone. We realised it in the evening when balancing the sales," he said.
Arinanye adds that when he called the number, the owner denied receiving it and switched off his phone. The case is registered at police under case Ref.SD 17/05/09/2013. "When I contacted MTN to block the money which was deposited on that account, they told me they can't do it unless I get a court order since the suspect is also their client. By the time I got the court order, the money had been withdrawn and the phone switched off. It will never be recovered," says Arinanye.
With a bank loan to clear and no more start-up capital, Arinanye's business collapsed.
Pin code:
In another trick, conmen master the agent's pin code by giving him an invalid number which he repeatedly dials while entering his code. When he gives the fraudster the phone to type in the correct number, he sends all the agent's money to himself and disappears. The agent realises later that he was robbed.
Another victim, Cissy Namayanja, says she received a call from 0704300989 and a man claimed he had credited her account by mistake. "I checked my account and there was no credit. After like two minutes, the person called again inquiring whether I had received a message. I realised the message had just come in saying, 'You have received 850,000'. He said that he was an agent who was sending money to a client and that I should reverse the transaction from my side. He asked whether I had any money on my account to which I said yes. He proceeded to give me a code and finally told me the transaction was hanging since I needed more money on my account as transfer charges.
The message I got on the screen meant nothing and this guy never credited my account in error but wanted to access what I had using the code he provided. I don't know how those messages work but I didn't even think of checking my account balance first. I think the screen message I read facilitated him to withdraw the money," Namayanja says.
Other fraudsters go to mobile money agents while driving expensive vehicles and pretend to be rushing. They ask for a deposit of huge amounts, say Shs 3m. After sending, they give the agent fake currency and distract him so that he doesn't realise the fake money. By the time you realise it is fake, the fraudster has vanished.
Network busy:
The thugs also take advantage of network problems in an area to deposit money on their phones. When the agent gives them his phone to enter the mobile money pin code, they send the money quickly but delete the sent message and tell the agent that indeed the network is off and disappear without paying.
Armed with a fake message that shows funds on the phone, a fraudster can pretend to be in a rush and ask the agent to give him cash but retain the phone to withdraw the money he has taken when the network resumes.
Conmen also use the MTN back-up customer service for contacts or Sim card registration by pretending to be employees backing up or registering Sim cards. After swapping your card with another, they use it to commit crimes. When police tracks the line, an unsuspecting victim is arrested.
Fraudsters are also targeting money transfer agents such as Western Money Union and Money Gram.They hack emails and get all the details of the sender and receiver. They forge the identification of the receiver and then withdraw the money. By the time the rightful owner goes to claim the money, the fraudster is targeting his next victim.
Telecoms employees:
Many mobile money users don't know how to check the balance on their phones and think receiving a message is actual money sent to them. Some thieves are now claiming to be priests or pastors who erroneously sent money meant for orphans.
Many people do not know how to send back money from their phones to another person. Some rely on agents to help them send money and even disclose their passwords to agents. They then realise later that no money has been sent to you and yet you have already sent them your own money.
According to police, some of the fraudsters are former employees of telecom companies, who connive with current employees to withdraw money from accounts with huge sums.
"We are investigating a case where a woman left Shs 100m on her mobile account at night. By morning, the money was deposited on a different mobile account and withdrawn," our police source told us.
Mobile money agents are the biggest target of fraudsters posing as customers.
"We get so many cases of such victims everyday but the mobile telecom companies have failed to cooperate with police and give us particulars of the suspect immediately to act fast and arrest him. Getting a court order to block the phone takes two to three days and by this time the money has already been withdrawn," the source explains.
"The telecom companies can't give police the particulars of the suspect unless they apply for a mobile money printout statement which takes between five days to two weeks to get. It costs Shs 30,000 at MTN and Shs 20,000 in other telecom companies. It takes long to get the printout because most of the times the network is off and there are long queues," the source adds.
Even with a printout, telecom companies give only the telephone number of the suspect, withholding details such as name and photograph. This makes it difficult for police to track the suspect. He says numbers are registered in abbreviations like WMJG JSM or Tpg TSM. One could be registered as Rose Nabitalo yet the actual owner of the phone is Uthuman Kimalo. "I don't see any impact of telecom companies in registering Sim cards if they can't reveal all the particulars of suspects to police to arrest criminals," the source adds.
Kampala Metropolitan Police Spokesperson Ibn Ssenkumbi said they want telecom companies and Uganda Communications Commission to freeze the accounts that receive the stolen money until investigations are completed.
UCC communications manager Fred Otunnu says mobile money will be streamlined with Bank of Uganda under the Financial Institutions Act.
"We shall highlight all the issues affecting the mobile money business to improve services," he said.
Ronald Lwasa Mpijja, the investigating officer of Mobile Money fraud at Kampala Central Police Station, says their main suspect is one Kenneth Olinawe with telephone number 0777556820.
He said according to their investigations, some fraudsters are in a racket using one phone with different Sim cards to con mobile money agents. "It has been proven by the mobile money printout which indicates the same serial telephone number used by different Sim-cards in stealing the money. They use one phone to commit several crimes," Lwasa said.
He added that police are hunting down the owners of telephone numbers used in mobile money fraud.
